Centenial Celebration

Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.

Date: April 30, 2024 Tue

Time: 3:49 am

Results for economic crime

9 results found

Author: Travers, Harry, ed.

Title: Serious Economic Crime: A boardroom guide to prevention and compliance

Summary: In many ways this publication, with its contributions from both the public and private sector, and from a wide variety of expert sources, is emblematic of this new approach. Part I features chapters from a number of regulators and key bodies. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) describes the role it plays in prosecuting market abuse and insider dealing, while the chapter by the City of London Police highlights what can be achieved by domestic prosecution agencies working in partnership with equivalent agencies on a global scale. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) expands on the benefits of international co-operation, following closely the pioneering Oslo conference that brought governments, non-governmental organisations and business together in the fight against financial crime, while the World Bank outlines the historic 2010 agreement between multilateral development banks to adopt common definitions of fraud and due process and, crucially, to recognise and enforce debarment decisions of the other signatories. The chapter by Transparency International brings global perspectives on counter-corruption measures, and in a separate chapter the World Bank outlines its anti-corruption agenda. We hear also from the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) on the European Union approach to combating money laundering, while the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics introduces non-regulatory compliance solutions.

Details: London: White Page Ltd, 2011. 312p.

Source: White Paper: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 27, 2012 at http://www.seriouseconomiccrime.com/ebooks/Serious-Economic-Crime.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: United States

URL: http://www.seriouseconomiccrime.com/ebooks/Serious-Economic-Crime.pdf

Shelf Number: 123833

Keywords:
Business Community
Businesses and Crime
Corporate Crime
Criminal Investigations
Economic Crime
Prosecution

Author: Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia

Title: The Bolivia Country Program 2010-2015. Capacity Building in Response to Drugs, Organized Crime, Terrorism, Corruption, and Economic Crime Threats in Bolivia

Summary: Bolivia is located in the center of South America and shares borders with Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile and Peru. Extending across 1,098,581 km (424,160 sq miles), it has an estimated population of 10 million inhabitants (2009), 66% of whom live in urban areas. According to the Constitution, Bolivia is a Social, Unitary State of Plurinational Communitarian Law, free, independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralized and with autonomies. It was founded on political, economic, judicial, cultural and linguistic plurality and pluralism, within the integrative process of the country. In 2005, approximately 59% of the population was living without their basic needs satisfied, and 37% lived in extreme poverty. In 2007, the estimated per capita income was US $1,363 a year. The life expectancy rate is 63 years, while the infant mortality rate for this same period was defined at 61 for every 1000 live births. After a long period characterized by political instability and social conflicts, in 2005 indigenous leader Evo Morales was elected President of what is now the Plurinational State of Bolivia, marking the beginning of a period of profound political and socioeconomic change. A Constitutional Assembly was summoned to enact these changes, and at the end of 2008 a new constitutional text was approved, which enabled all institutional structures to be adapted to the new ethno-cultural and regional plurality of the country. The New Political State Constitution incorporates important advances and changes in citizen rights, gender, natural resources and administration of justice. The Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia has shifted from a neoliberal development model to a mixed economy, where the State plays a greater role in the economy. In so doing, the State has taken control of the principal source of income in the country: hydrocarbons, namely natural gas, and is promoting other important industrial development projects in the fields of metallurgy, construction, food and paper. The surplus generated from natural gas exportation to neighboring countries contributes to income redistribution policies, in addition to boosting the national petroleum company. In this way, the past few years have witnessed the creation of wealth redistribution mechanisms aimed at reversing the existing conditions of poverty and inequality, such as the Dignity Payment for senior citizens, the Juancito Pinto Bond for the student population and the Juana Azurduy Bond for pregnant women. The principal macroeconomic indicators show that the Bolivian economy has improved. From 2006-2009, the GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.8%, the inflation was 0.3% at the end of this period and the fiscal surplus was 2.5% of the GDP. Private foreign inversion recovered in 2006, at US $278 million, topping off at US $370 million in 2008. Exportations in 2008 reached US $4,846 million, resulting in a positive trade balance of US $1,223 million. In 2009 the external public debt increased to US $2,583 million, following an important reduction in previous years. These indicators show a generally positive economic performance within a framework of both internal and external macroeconomic stability, providing greater strength to the Bolivian State´s fight against poverty. The Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, encouraged by the U.N., is making important efforts to reach the Millennium Goals. Bolivia has been declared the third country in the region free of illiteracy, with the backing of UNESCO. Likewise, gender gaps in primary education and infant and maternal mortality rates have been reduced, and basic sanitary services have reached a considerable proportion of the rural population. In Bolivia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been working since the end of the 1980s on alternative development projects in coca growing regions, including the construction of infrastructure for social and productive uses, improving agricultural production, encouraging forestry and agroforestry development, promoting the microbusiness sector and job skills training. The UNODC also implemented drug prevention programs within the educational system, as well as strengthening the government entities related to controlling drug use and related crimes, including the implementation of informational systems for monitoring coca plantations, alternative development and illegal drug use. Technical cooperation activities have been reduced in the past few years, from an annual portfolio of US $5.4 million in 2002 to US $1.6 million in 2009. As a result, in April of 2009, the UNODC representative finalized his/her mission in the country and decided to reduce office personnel, as the reduced volume of activities no longer justified a Representation Office in Bolivia. As of June of 2009, development program activities were administered with the aid of the Latin America and the Caribbean Unit (LACU/DO) of UNODC, based in Vienna. In June of 2009, the Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia requested that the Executive Director of the UNODC maintain Office Representation status in the country and continue providing technical assistance. They also asked the European Commission to reinforce the UNODC´s financial cooperation program in the country. In response to this request, the UNODC sent a programming mission headed by the Head of the Latin American and the Caribbean Unit to the country in October of 2009. The objectives of the mission were: i) Prepare a Country Program 2010- 2015 document in direct collaboration with State institutions and international organizations; ii) Exchange criteria with the Government authorities of the Plurinational State of Bolivia about the reestablishment of an active/functional Office of Representation; and iii) Support the implementation of the profile of projects currently in process. In order for the Country Program to be prepared with accurate information, the agenda of the mission included a workshop with participants from governmental institutions and international organizations. The participants analyzed the current status of the fight against drugs, organized crime and corruption. They also identified priority areas where the UNODC could provide technical assistance. Sixty three representatives of 12 different State institutions working in drug and crime prevention were present at the workshop, as well as 19 counterparts from international organizations. The workshop´s success was a result of the participants´ interest in the topic, the high level of discussion generated and the quality of proposals which were produced. This UNODC Bolivia Country Program (2010-2015) reflects the primary conclusions and recommendations which came out of the workshop, as well as information obtained in interviews with the participating institutions.

Details: La Paz, Bolivia: Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2010.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/bolivia//proyectos_bolivia/The_UNODC_Bolivia_Country_Program_2010-2015.pdf

Year: 2010

Country: Bolivia

URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/bolivia//proyectos_bolivia/The_UNODC_Bolivia_Country_Program_2010-2015.pdf

Shelf Number: 127529

Keywords:
Corruption
Drug Abuse and Crime
Drug Trafficking (Bolivia)
Economic Crime
Organized Crime
Terrorism

Author: Lallerstedt, Karl

Title: Illicit Trade Flows: How to deal with the neglected economic and security threat

Summary: Illicit trade flows generate massive costs for the EU, yet the countermeasures have been inadequate. A shortage of data, the tendency to look at different forms of illicit trade as separate phenomena, and the complexity of the problem have led to an under-prioritisation of illicit trade among policymakers. Globally, the illicit trade in products that replace those that are generally licit (such as counterfeit goods and contraband excise goods) represents the biggest monetary turnover and hurts government and corporate revenues directly. Still, it is particularly under-prioritised. Synergistic effects for smuggling different items relate to the fact that there are over one thousand international poly-crime groups operating in the EU, the same smuggling routes can be used for different commodities, and the same corrupt officials or purveyors of false documentation can deliver their services to multiple "operators". Illicit trade also makes the EU more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. It finances terrorist organisations, and well-established smuggling routes make the borders more porous. To address the problem, better data need to be generated showing its extent and impact. Taking a holistic view of the various aspects of illicit trade is important to facilitate coordination among the relevant authorities. The costs of this work represent investments which - beyond enhancing security - will generate income by boosting tax revenues, reducing crime, creating jobs and driving economic growth.

Details: Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2014. 10p.

Source: Internet Resource: FIIA Briefing Paper 151: Accessed August 11, 2014 at: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/405/illicit_trade_flows/

Year: 2014

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/405/illicit_trade_flows/

Shelf Number: 132970

Keywords:
Economic Crime
Illegal Trade (Europe)
Illicit Trade
Smuggling

Author: Shentov, Ognian

Title: Shadow Power: Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe

Summary: The current report, prepared by the Southeast European Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI) – the largest indigenous good governance initiative in SEE – makes an important contribution to the regional approach to anticorruption. It provides a civil society view of the state of corruption and comes in the wake of the 2014 SELDI comprehensive assessment of the various aspects of the legal and institutional anticorruption environments of nine SEE countries. In 2016, SELDI followed up on these assessments with an update of corruption monitoring and a special focus on state capture in the energy sector and the corruption– hidden economy nexus. The report underscores the need for broader political action for reform, which seems blocked or narrowing across the region. Inside pressure for such action has been suffocated by economic necessity and/or ethnic divisions, and the ossification of political and economic establishments. Outside pressure, delivered mostly by the European Union, has been seen as wanting in relation to the size of the problems in the past couple of years due to a succession of internal and external crises. In none of the countries in the region has there been a clear and sustained policy breakthrough in anticorruption, although efforts to deliver technical solutions and to improve the functioning of the law enforcement institutions, mostly with support from the EU, have continued and even intensified in some cases. This has led to further slow decline in administrative corruption levels but at the expense of waning public support for reforms and of declining trust in national and European institutions. SELDI's Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) – its analytical tool for measuring corruption – has identified three trends in the dynamics of corruption in the region: • Since the early 2000s when SELDI started its monitoring the overall levels of corruption in the SEE countries have gone down, and the public has become more demanding of good governance. • Yet, progress has been slow and erratic, and corruption continues to be both a major preoccupation for the general public and a common occurrence in the civil service and senior government. Specifically, in the 2014 – 2016 period corruption pressure – the primary quantitative indicator for the levels of corruption in a country – has relapsed in some countries, but the overall improvement in the region was negligible. • The combination of stubbornly high rates of rent-seeking from corrupt officials and rising expectations for good governance related mostly to EU accession aspirations in SEE have shaped negatively public expectations about potential corruption pressure. More than half of the population of the SELDI countries believe it is likely to have to give a bribe to an official to get things done. This indicates that the restoration of trust in institutions would be much more difficult than the mere reduction in the levels of administrative corruption. As a result, public trust in the feasibility of policy responses to corruption – a critical ally to successful anticorruption reforms – which reflects the share of the population who believe in the anticorruption efforts of their governments has stayed below the 50% threshold in 2016 for all SEE countries but Montenegro and Turkey. This further exacerbates the unwillingness of politicians to engage in anticorruption policies, and shows the need for a broad-based social movement to sustain an anticorruption focus. The overall conclusion from the 2016 round of the SELDI CMS is that the policies which target corrupt behaviour at administrative level and those seeking to change trust in government need to be pursued in concert. If not complemented by strengthened public demand for integrity in government and sustained improvement in economic well-being, stricter enforcement of penal measures cannot have a sustainable effect. Law enforcement would likely be seen either as useless repression when targeting lower government levels alone or as political witch-hunt when intermittently directed at higher levels. Conversely, intensifying awareness-building measures would only fuel cynicism and resignation in the public if it is not accompanied by visible efforts for cracking down on (high-level) rent-seeking officials

Details: Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI); Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 82p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 24, 2017 at: http://www.clds.rs/newsite/SHADOW_POWER_final.pdf

Year: 2016

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.clds.rs/newsite/SHADOW_POWER_final.pdf

Shelf Number: 144577

Keywords:
Anticorruption
Corruption
Economic Crime
Financial Crimes
Fraud
Hidden Economy
Political Corruption

Author: Council of Europe. Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL)

Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Latvia. Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Reform

Summary: In a report published today on Latvia, MONEYVAL acknowledges that large financial flows passing through the country pose a significant money laundering threat. Latvia is a regional financial centre, with a majority of its commercial banks focusing on servicing foreign customers, mainly from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. Hence one of Latvia's key money laundering (ML) risks remains the vulnerability of CIS countries to economic crime, especially corruption. Latvia's own level of corruption, vulnerability to international organised crime and significant shadow economy are also key factors of the overall ML risk faced by Latvia. The report concludes that the overall appreciation of ML and financing of terrorism (FT) risk in the financial sector is not commensurate with the factual exposure of financial institutions in general, and banks in particular, to the risk of being misused for ML and FT. The general understanding of risks among designated non-financial businesses and professions is limited to risks relevant for their particular businesses and professions; it does not amount to an appropriate perception and awareness of ML/FT risks. MONEYVAL underlines that certain authorities, such as the Office for the Prevention of Laundering of Proceeds Derived from Criminal Activity (financial intelligence unit) and the Financial Capital Market Commission (FCMC), demonstrated a rather broad understanding of the risks within the anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) system. However, there is uneven and overall inadequate appreciation of the potentially ML related cross-border flows of funds passing through Latvia. The supervisors demonstrate widely varying views and knowledge about ML/FT risks. Despite the knowledgeable and persistent approach taken by the FCMC to the non-resident banking sector, change of risk-appetite in this sector remains slow. The report acknowledges that since the last evaluation, Latvia has taken steps to improve its AML/CFT legal framework. At the same time the report states that Latvia's legal basis for targeted financial sanctions in the area of FT and proliferation financing calls for urgent clarifications and improvements. It is unclear whether the competent authorities have taken sufficient steps and have the necessary means to mitigate targeted financial sanctions-evasion risks. The Enterprise Register will be populated by beneficial ownership information obtained from all legal entities. However, this functionality was not up and running as of the time of the visit. When fully implemented, information contained in the Enterprise Register will be publicly accessible. The report states that, until recently, the judicial system of Latvia did not appear to consider ML as a priority. ML was not investigated and prosecuted in line with its risk profile as a regional financial centre. While results from conviction-based confiscation are hampered by the modest number of ML-convictions, non-conviction based confiscation brought some encouraging first results, allowing Latvian authorities to confiscate considerable amounts in both domestic and international cases. International cooperation constitutes a critical component of the country's AML/CFT system. MONEYVAL praises Latvia for proactively cooperating with foreign counterparts, effectively providing and seeking not only mutual legal assistance, but also exchanging financial intelligence, and engaging in joint investigations and cooperation meetings with positive results. Latvia is to report back to MONEYVAL at the last Plenary meeting in 2019 about the implementation of its recommendations under enhanced follow-up procedures. The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism - MONEYVAL is a permanent monitoring body of the Council of Europe entrusted with the task of assessing compliance with the principal international standards to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism and the effectiveness of their implementation, as well as with the task of making recommendations to national authorities in respect of necessary improvements to their systems. The evaluation of Latvia's anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism system was based on the 2012 Financial Action Task Force Recommendations, and was prepared using the 2013 Methodology. The evaluation summarises the anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism measures in place in Latvia as at the date of the onsite visit (30 October to 10 November 2017).

Details: Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2018. 224p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 27, 2018 at: https://rm.coe.int/moneyval-2018-8-5th-round-mer-latvia/16808ce61b

Year: 2018

Country: Latvia

URL: https://rm.coe.int/moneyval-2018-8-5th-round-mer-latvia/16808ce61b

Shelf Number: 151274

Keywords:
Banks
Economic Crime
Financial Crime
Money Laundering
Terrorist Financing

Author: Smoyer, Amy B.

Title: A Study on the Global Governance Architecture for Combating Illicit Financial Flows

Summary: The most up-to-date estimates by the Economic Commission for Africa indicate that during the period 2000-2015, net illicit financial flows between Africa and the rest of the world averaged US$73 billion (at 2016 prices) per year from trade misinvoicing alone. Recent exposure of illicit financial flow scandals shows that those involved in such activities have used a range of practices to perpetrate the flows. Furthermore, there are a number of fundamental enablers of illicit financial flows that cut across institutions, sectors and stakeholders, such as: the benefits to the perpetuators, the facilitating infrastructure, the absorptive jurisdictions and the constraints of public authorities. Since the release of the African Union-Economic Commission for Africa High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows report in 2015, some headway has been made at the global level, but this continues to be in silos of sectors, groups of nations or stakeholders. Moreover, evidence reviewed for this study suggests that illicit financial flows continue to present a serious challenge to development in Africa. Given that illicit financial flows from Africa involve actors from across the globe, and that the laws and policies of non-African jurisdictions have a serious impact on illicit flows from Africa, it has become a priority to review the adequacy of global frameworks in tackling illicit financial flows (High-level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, 2015). In the present study, the global framework or architecture for combating illicit financial flows and its effectiveness in tackling the illicit financial flow problem are examined. Another objective of the study is to identify the gaps in the existing architecture for preventing illicit financial flows, and how Africa should feed into this process to improve its efficiency, effectiveness and inclusiveness. The literature available on the issue was examined, while delving into the framework for tackling illicit financial flows, and analysing actions and their impacts on: (a) the world as a whole; (b) the subregions of Africa; and (c) individual African countries, with a focus on Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Morocco and South Africa, from which primary data were collected to support the study.

Details: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: The Commission, 2018. 72p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2018 at: https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/global-governance_eng_rev.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Africa

URL: https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/global-governance_eng_rev.pdf

Shelf Number: 151653

Keywords:
Economic Crime
Financial Crime
Illicit Wealth
Money Laundering
Profits of Crime

Author: Economic Commission for Africa (Addis Ababa)

Title: A Study on the Global Governance Architecture for Combating Illicit Financial Flows

Summary: The most up-to-date estimates by the Economic Commission for Africa indicate that during the period 2000-2015, net illicit financial flows between Africa and the rest of the world averaged US$73 billion (at 2016 prices) per year from trade misinvoicing alone. Recent exposure of illicit financial flow scandals shows that those involved in such activities have used a range of practices to perpetrate the flows. Furthermore, there are a number of fundamental enablers of illicit financial flows that cut across institutions, sectors and stakeholders, such as: the benefits to the perpetuators, the facilitating infrastructure, the absorptive jurisdictions and the constraints of public authorities. Since the release of the African Union-Economic Commission for Africa High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows report in 2015, some headway has been made at the global level, but this continues to be in silos of sectors, groups of nations or stakeholders. Moreover, evidence reviewed for this study suggests that illicit financial flows continue to present a serious challenge to development in Africa. Given that illicit financial flows from Africa involve actors from across the globe, and that the laws and policies of non-African jurisdictions have a serious impact on illicit flows from Africa, it has become a priority to review the adequacy of global frameworks in tackling illicit financial flows (High-level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, 2015). In the present study, the global framework or architecture for combating illicit financial flows and its effectiveness in tackling the illicit financial flow problem are examined. Another objective of the study is to identify the gaps in the existing architecture for preventing illicit financial flows, and how Africa should feed into this process to improve its efficiency, effectiveness and inclusiveness. The literature available on the issue was examined, while delving into the framework for tackling illicit financial flows, and analysing actions and their impacts on: (a) the world as a whole; (b) the subregions of Africa; and (c) individual African countries, with a focus on Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Morocco and South Africa, from which primary data were collected to support the study.

Details: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: The Commission, 2018. 72p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2018 at: https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/global-governance_eng_rev.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: Africa

URL: https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/global-governance_eng_rev.pdf

Shelf Number: 151653

Keywords:
Economic Crime
Financial Crime
Illicit Wealth
Money Laundering
Profits of Crime

Author: Australia. The Treasury

Title: A sharing economy reporting regime A consultation paper in response to the Black Economy Taskforce Final Report

Summary: The Black Economy Taskforce (the Taskforce) was established in December 2016 to develop a forward-looking, multi-pronged policy response to combat the black economy in Australia. The Black Economy Taskforce's final report (the Taskforce's report) highlighted the harm that the black economy causes to businesses and the community, penalising honest taxpayers, undermining the integrity of Australia's tax and welfare systems and creating an uneven playing field for the majority of small businesses doing the right thing. This impact is being felt by many businesses and consumers, including those in the sharing economy. The sharing economy has grown significantly in recent years, facilitating innovation, job growth and more choice for consumers. During its consultations, the Taskforce heard that as the sharing economy grows there is an increasing risk that sellers (participants selling goods and services via sharing economy platforms) may not be paying the right amount of tax. This potential underpayment of tax undermines the benefits of the sharing economy to consumers and businesses, and creates an unfair playing field for those doing the right thing. The ATO has entered into arrangements with some platforms to provide information under its existing information gathering powers. Data collection in the ride sourcing sector has enabled the ATO to undertake preventative activities that help drivers to understand and comply with their obligations. However, a more comprehensive regime is needed to more broadly improve compliance in this area. To combat this issue, the Taskforce's report recommended that a compulsory reporting regime be established: 'Operators of designated sharing ('gig') economy websites should be required to report payments made to their users to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Department of Social Services (DSS) and other government agencies as appropriate. The Government should also continue to raise users' awareness about the potential tax obligations from participation in sharing economy activities.' As part of the 2018-19 Federal Budget the Government responded to the Taskforce's report, agreeing that there should be greater transparency of payments made through sharing economy websites and announcing that it would consult on how this recommendation could be implemented. In agreeing with this recommendation, the Government noted that innovation in business models should be supported by Government and the community, and regulatory changes should aim to minimise the regulatory burden, and support a level playing field with existing, compliant businesses. This consultation paper is seeking input on the design of a new reporting regime for sharing economy activities.

Details: Parkes ACT: The Author, 2019. 15p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2019 at: https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2019/01/Consultation-Paper-A-sharing-economy-reporting-regime-1.pdf

Year: 2019

Country: Australia

URL: https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2019/01/Consultation-Paper-A-sharing-economy-reporting-regime-1.pdf

Shelf Number: 154640

Keywords:
Black Economy
Economic Crime
Financial Crimes
Tax Evasion
Underground Economy

Author: Australia. The Treasury

Title: Black Economy Taskforce: Final Report

Summary: Following an initial investigation by the Board of Taxation, supported by Treasury and the ATO, the Government (in December 2016) established this Taskforce to develop an innovative, forward-looking and genuinely whole-of-government strategy to combat the black economy. The black economy is a significant, complex and growing economic and social problem. In our opinion, it could have increased in size by up to 50 per cent since 2012. The costs it entails are not only financial in nature (lower tax revenues and higher welfare costs), but also societal. The black economy is manifestly unfair, allowing some to play by their own rules and penalising businesses, employees and consumers who do the right thing. Under cover of the black economy, vulnerable workers are exploited, criminal groups flourish and social capital and trust are undermined. The black economy is not standing still, but rapidly shifting and evolving in step with wider economic, technological and social changes. It is a growing problem which, if not dealt with, can develop a dangerous momentum of its own: a 'race-to-the-bottom' which we are already seeing in particular areas. In 2012, the Australian Bureau of Statistics estimated that the black economy equated to 1.5 per cent of GDP, with the illicit drug industry adding a further 0.4 per cent of GDP. This estimate is now outdated. We consider that the black economy could be as large as 3 per cent of GDP (roughly $50 billion) today, given the trends we identify in this Report. A sense of urgency is needed from policymakers, leaving behind business-as-usual approaches from the past. A new strategy and commitment is required: one which addresses underlying causes, not symptoms, while keeping regulatory burdens low; one which goes beyond tax; and one which breaks down agency silos and embraces joint action and the intelligent use of data and analytics. This Taskforce was a genuinely whole-of-government undertaking, bringing together 20 Commonwealth agencies. This agenda has a clear purpose and objective: to make our society both fairer and more equitable by creating a level playing field. To the extent that this yields a revenue dividend, the Government's capacity to fund needed services (or provide tax relief or lower deficits) will be greater. Combatting the black economy is not just a matter for governments. We all need to be part of the solution. We need a new social contract: a renewed commitment from the business community and wider public to fight the black economy. Our hope is that our work, including our public hearings and consultations, has helped start an overdue national conversation. In the time since the Interim Report in March, the Government announced the adoption of two of our key recommendations in the 2017-18 Budget. In late May and throughout June, we conducted a national roadshow, holding public hearings and industry roundtables in every state capital city and the regional centres of Bathurst, Mildura and the Gold Coast. We have received 149 submissions from businesses, unions, community organisations, state and territory governments and members of the public. The Taskforce Chairman has held over 140 bilateral meetings with stakeholder representatives. In August, we released a detailed consultation paper containing over 50 ideas. Perhaps as a result of this review, we have been told by tax and law enforcement authorities that public reporting and enforcement of black economy offences has increased.

Details: Parkes, ACT, The Author, 2017. 377p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2019 at: https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2018/05/Black-Economy-Taskforce_Final-Report.pdf

Year: 2017

Country: Australia

URL: https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2018/05/Black-Economy-Taskforce_Final-Report.pdf

Shelf Number: 154645

Keywords:
Black Economy
Economic Crime
Financial Crimes
Tax Evasion
Underground Economy